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Abstract 
 
Labour leasing or agency labour (also known as labour hire in Australia and New 
Zealand) is a rapidly growing work arrangement in most if not all industrialised 
countries. Unlike the two-party employer/employee relationship, labour leasing 
establishes a three-party or triangular relationship between the worker, the agency that 
supplies them and the host employer. There is emerging evidence that this triangular 
relationship, in combination with the temporary nature of most placements, poses 
particular problems for laws regulating employment conditions (industrial relations, 
occupational health and safety (OHS), and workers’ compensation/social security) and 
the agencies administering them. This paper examines recent Australian experience with 
regard to protecting the health and safety of agency workers, drawing on detailed 
interviews and workplace visits with inspectors, as well as analysis of statutory 
provisions, documentary records (such as reports and guidance material), and 
enforcement activity (notably prosecutions) by OHS agencies. 
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Introduction 
 
Labour leasing or temporary agency work (also known by the older term ‘labour hire’ in 
Australia and New Zealand) refers to the practice whereby workers engaged by a third 
party firm or agency (as an employee or independent contractor) are supplied to 
undertake tasks for other ‘host’ employers on a temporary basis. A variety of terms are 
used to describe leased workers, some specific to a particular country or industry, 
including labour hire, body hire, agency workers, on-hire workers, temps, top-up team 
and peak period people.  
 
The practice of labour leasing is not new. In industries like construction and agriculture 
the use of ‘body hire’ agents can be traced back more than 100 years. However, over the 
past 20 years the extent of these practices has expanded dramatically in Europe, North 
America and Australasia in terms of the number of firms supplying labour, the number of 
workers supplied and range of occupations involved (encompassing everything from 
labourers and clerical staff to drivers, miners and skilled professionals like nurses and 
engineers). While the labour leasing industry includes many small operators, some firms, 
like Manpower and ADECCO, operate globally and have become major employers in 
their own right.  
 
While it appears that most temporary employees are still hired directly by their 
employers, agency workers represent an increasingly significant component of the 
contingent workforce. As far as we are aware, the OECD, ILO and similar agencies do 
not produce comparable data (published or unpublished) on the prevalence of labour 
leasing. Compilation of data would present considerable difficulties, as many countries 
do not collect the relevant information on a regular basis. There are also problems 
ensuring reasonable definitional consistency: for example, distinguishing between 
employment agencies (who see their only task as job placement) and labour leasing 
firms; as well as whether to recognise firms that lease their workers out on an informal or 
occasional basis even though this is not their principal business (for recent OHS cases 
involving such firms see WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Legge) v Coffey 
Engineering Pty Ltd (no.2) (2001) 110 IR 447; and WorkCover Authority of New South 
(Inspector Dall) v Daracon Contractors Pty Limited [2005] NSWIRComm 149).  
 
Nonetheless, evidence that does exist indicates significant growth. A survey by the US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS, 1995a&b) found that the number of workers employed 
by firms supplying temporary help, and employing 20 or more workers, grew by 43% 
between 1989 and 1994 – a period when overall non-farm employment grew by only 5%. 
One labour-leasing firm, Manpower, now claims to be the largest single employer in the 
USA. Similarly, in the UK the number of agency workers increased from 50,000 in 1984 
to 250,000 in 1999 (Forde, 2001: 631). A report on temporary agency work in the 
European Union (Storrie, 2002: 1-2) pointed to its rapid growth, with an estimated two 
million (or 1.2% of the workforce) working in this sector by 1999. In Australia, surveys 
undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 1998-99 and 2001 suggested 
that between two and five percent of employees were agency workers (the large range is 
due to different survey methods employed), while a far larger number (about 12% of 
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employees) obtained their jobs through agencies (Burgess, Rasmussen and Connell, 
2004: 27). The ABS surveys did not include trend data but other research suggests a 
pattern of rapid growth similar to the USA and Europe. For example, a study by the 
WorkCover Corporation of South Australia found that total remuneration paid by the 
labour hire industry (a crude indicator of employment) grew by 550% in the decade after 
1991 (for other references to growth see New South Wales Labour Hire Task Force, 
2001: 15-31). 
 
The reasons for the growth of agency labour are the subject of ongoing debate. It is 
principally seen to be part of the shift to contingent work arrangements more generally 
with causal factors commonly identified including the competitive pressures associated 
with globalisation (and the internationalization of labour supply firms as well as 
management consulting firms advocating ‘outsourcing’), public sector reforms that 
increased the demand for ‘outside’ labour, private sector downsizing/restructuring (see 
for example Burgess, Rasmussen and Connell, 2004: 28-30). There is evidence that 
regulatory and institutional differences between countries may influence the extent to 
which agency workers and other contingent workers are used (Olsen and Kalleberg, 
2004). 
 
Over the past decade labour leasing has attracted increased attention from government 
agencies and academic researchers (see for example, Peck and Theodore, 1998; NSW 
Labour Hire Task Force, 2001; Storrie, 2002; Economic Development Committee, 2004; 
Olsen and Kalleberg, 2004). Leased labour entails a triangular relationship between the 
worker, the temporary work agency and the host employer: generally the contractual 
relationships are between the agency and the worker and the agency and the host, with no 
contractual relationship between the host and the worker. These relationships result in 
complex overlapping responsibilities in terms of managing the employment relationship 
and workers meeting the expectations of two ‘masters’. Rubery et al (2002: 645) argue 
the consequent blurring of responsibilities for performance and occupational health and 
safety (OHS) ‘affects not only legal responsibilities, grievance and disciplinary issues and 
the extent and transparency of equity in employment conditions, but also the definition, 
constitution and implementation of the employment contract defined in psychological and 
social terms.’ 
 
More specifically, several studies have found that human resource management functions 
have been largely transferred to the temporary work agency, and the replacement of 
permanent with temporary workers has also been associated with a shift to ‘hard’ human 
resources practices which emphasise short-term cost-cutting and discipline over building 
organisational commitment through consultation (see for example Storey, 2001 and 
Connell and Burgess, 2002). Other studies have examined the wage rates and working 
conditions of temporary agency workers as well as their attitudes to this type of work 
arrangement (see for example Dietz, 1996 and Allach and Inkson, 2004). 
 
The growth of temporary agency work poses a number of challenges for labour, OHS, 
workers’ compensation/social security, taxation and other legislation. These laws were, 
by and large, predicated on the presumption of direct and ongoing employment 
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arrangements. As already noted, leased labour entails a triangular relationship between 
agency workers, the temporary work agency and the host employer and this complicates 
regulatory oversight (Vosko, 1997 and Stanworth and Druker, 2000; Economic 
Development Committee, 2004). Even within the same jurisdiction, the allocation of 
legal responsibilities between the temporary work agency and host employer can vary 
according to the legislation establishing specific labour standards (industrial relations, 
OHS and workers’ compensation) or the precise circumstances of a particular work 
arrangement. In some areas, like OHS, responsibility is often shared, at least at the level 
of the obligations imposed by the OHS statutes (see the discussion below). This situation 
facilitates confusion and even efforts to manipulate legal liability, creating a challenge for 
government agencies in terms of ensuring regulatory coverage and compliance with 
labour standards. As early as the 1960s a number of European countries introduced 
regulatory measures to restrict the use of agency labour or impose additional conditions 
on its use (see Veldkamp and Raetsen, 1973). These measures (such as partial bans and 
licensing requirements) had limited effects and were revised in the context of both the 
growth of temporary work more generally and the increasing pre-eminence of market-
driven policies within the European Union (Stanworth and Druker, 2000). At the same 
time, recognition that many agency workers  (especially those lacking scarce skills) were 
vulnerable to exploitation (such as failing to receive statutory entitlements to overtime or 
holiday pay) has led to new regulatory measures, though questions have been raised with 
regard to the enforcement of these provisions (Stanworth and Druker, 2000. For evidence 
of a similar debate in Japan see Mizushima, 2004).  
 
In Australia, the few specific regulatory measures that might apply to agency labour 
(such as licensing requirements for employment agencies) were largely removed as part 
of the regulatory reform process undertaken in the 1980s. As in Europe, over the past five 
years policy makers have started to give consideration to the need to provide specific 
regulatory measures to address problems linked to agency employment. 
 
One of the most significant problems raised in connection with agency labour in 
Australia, the USA and other countries has concerned OHS: agency workers are at 
greater risk of injury and may be denied adequate protection under OHS legislation 
(including inspectoral activities) and workers’ compensation/rehabilitation laws. There is 
an emerging body of international evidence supporting the contention that agency 
workers face a greater risk of injury than other workers undertaking the same tasks (see 
for example Kochan et al, 1994; Butler, Park and Zaidman 1998; Foley, 1998; Hébert, 
Duguay and Massicotte, 2003; Silverstein et al 1998, 2002; and Francois, and Lievin, 
2000). For example, analyzing workers’ compensation claims data for work-related 
disorders of the upper extremities amongst temporary/contingent workers (labour hire) in 
Washington State between 1987 and 1995, Silverstein et al (1998) found temporary help 
agencies were in the top 10 high-risk industries after 1989, with claims being most 
pronounced with regard to assembly and machine operators, followed by construction 
workers. Similarly, a Quebec report (Hébert et al, 2003) analyzing compensated work-
related injury/illness absence for different industry sub-sectors (1995-97) found labour 
hire headed the list of the ten subsectors identified with the highest prevalence of 
compensated absence (at 81.5 with the next highest being carpentry at 49.3). 
 6
 
Findings of research undertaken in Australia are consistent with international studies. 
Underhill (2002) analysed workers’ compensation claims data in the state of Victoria for 
the period 1994-2001. She found the rapid growth of the industry was associated with a 
more than commensurate increase in workers’ compensation claims at the same time that 
the number of workers’ compensation claims by non-labour hire workers was indicating 
no measurable increase. Using ABS workforce survey data to estimate claim frequency 
rates, Underhill (2002: 4) found that 3.47% of labour hire workers made workers’ 
compensation claims in 1999/2000, compared to 1.85% of other Victorian employees. 
Further, examining the agency of injury, Underhill found labour hire workers faced a 
much greater likelihood of being hit by or hitting moving objects resulting in a higher 
level of wounds and crushing. They also experienced more trips and falls in occupations 
requiring mobility at the workplace as well as a higher level of repetitive strain injuries 
amongst clerical workers (Underhill, 2002: 5). Finally, in terms of claim duration 
Underhill (2002: 5) found that labour hire workers were responsible for a lower level of 
claims requiring less than 10 days off work but a higher level of claims requiring up to 
one year’s compensation (although she acknowledges reporting effects might affect this 
finding). It is worth noting that this report - commissioned by the government OHS 
agency in Victoria (Worksafe Victoria) – was subsequently criticized as ‘statistically 
invalid’ by the Recruitment and Consulting Services Association (RCSA Media Release 
15 June 2004), the peak body representing the labour hire industry – a claim vigorously 
denied by its author. 
 
Research findings pointing to inferior OHS outcomes for agency workers have reinforced 
concerns amongst regulatory agencies responsible for OHS and workers’ compensation, 
based on more fragmentary evidence and anecdotal experience. The latter include serious 
workplace incidents involving agency workers (and the evidence and enforcement issues 
revealed in subsequent coronial inquests, inspectoral investigations and prosecutions), 
observations by inspectors during routine inspections, complaints from unions as well as 
evidence of claim-shifting, manipulation and premium avoidance involving labour hire 
arrangements.  For example, a coronial inquest into the death of 19 year old recycling 
truck ‘runner’ Glenn Chapman (killed when he slipped off a footrest and a truck reversed 
over him) revealed that the young worker had received only ten minutes of verbal 
instruction about working on the back of the truck from CityWide Solutions, the labour 
hire firm that employed him (Occupational Health News, 2003: 2). Problems associated 
with protecting labour hire workers have also been raised in a series of state and federal 
government inquiries into OHS laws or related issues. This has sometimes occurred as 
part of a more general consideration of changing work arrangements. For example, in a 
discussion paper on workplace safety, prepared for the Royal Commission into the 
Building and Construction Industry, Durham (2002: 8) argued the association between 
contingent work arrangements, economic pressure and corner cutting was critical to the 
industry’s poor OHS performance. 
 
Over the past 20 years there has been a steady emergence of non-traditional 
working arrangements, including temporary workers such as casual and part-time 
employees and subcontractors, and labour hire companies. The construction 
industry has experienced a decrease in permanent employee numbers and a rise 
 7
in the number of businesses that rely on outsourced work. In this respect, the 
building and construction industry reflects trends in other industries. Building 
sites combine many enterprises. 
 
The economic environment of the industry drives a culture where the objective of 
many contractors working in the industry is to come to the site, start and finish 
the contracted work, and leave for the next job as quickly as possible. In this 
culture safe work practices are often regarded as likely to slow the work down 
and cost money. 
 
Notwithstanding this, labour hire/agency work has been singled out from other contingent 
work arrangements as warranting particular attention. This is highlighted by government 
inquiries into labour hire (see for example New South Wales Labour Hire Task Force 
2001; and Parliamentary Committee Inquiry into Labour Hire Employment in Victoria 
(Economic Development Committee, 2004)) as well as focused attention to it in more 
general government inquiries (see Maxwell, 2004), the production of guidance material 
on labour hire by OHS regulatory agencies and introduction of specific labour hire 
premium rates and targeted enforcement by workers’ compensation agencies. The OHS 
problems associated with labour hire have also been the subject of union reports and 
submissions (see for example CFMEU, no date) as well as specific claims in relation to 
award provisions (legally enforceable collective employment conditions handed down by 
industrial tribunals in Australia), most notably a recent test case on secure employment in 
New South Wales.  
 
In this paper we will focus on regulatory issues raised by agency labour in connection 
with OHS legislation (the challenges agency workers pose for workers’ compensation 
have been addressed in another paper, see Quinlan, 2004). After briefly describing 
research methods the paper argues that even though the Australian OHS legislation (with 
one exception) does not explicitly refer to labour hire, the general duty provisions do 
provide a reasonable framework for the regulation of OHS in labour hire arrangements. 
We also show that the courts, in attributing responsibility between labour hire agencies 
and host employers, start with the view that responsibility is shared equally, although the 
circumstances of each case may result in the court imposing greater culpability on one of 
the parties. We show, however, that despite the relatively clear legal framework 
regulating OHS in labour hire, labour hire agencies and host firms involved in triangular 
labour hire relationships regard the allocation of responsibility as a contested terrain, and 
evidence (including evidence from OHS inspectorates) indicates considerable variations 
amongst labour hire firms in terms of acknowledging and meeting their statutory 
responsibilities. Labour hire representatives have claimed that there are practical 
difficulties in meeting their extensive legal obligations. Some labour hire agencies and 
representatives have sought to reduce or limit their legal obligations through various 
measures, including lobbying government and the use of hold harmless clauses. Finally, 
the paper then argues that there is an ill-fit between provisions for worker participation in 
the OHS statutes (health and safety representatives and committees), and labour hire 
arrangements which undermines the effectiveness of worker participation arrangements 
in labour hire. 
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Research Methods 
 
Research data in this paper are drawn from three sources. First, the paper draws on a 
research project undertaken for WorkCover New South Wales on the prevention and 
workers’ compensation challenges posed by changing work arrangements undertaken 
between November 2001 and September 2002 (Quinlan, 2003). The project (hereafter 
referred to as the WorkCover NSW project) covered state, territory and federal OHS 
jurisdictions (not just New South Wales), and received the active cooperation of all 
relevant government agencies. As part of this process meetings were held with 10 of the 
12 tripartite industry reference groups (IRG’s) established in New South Wales to 
identify relevant issues. Following this, focus group and individual interviews were 
conducted (using a semi-structured interview schedule) with 63 OHS regulatory staff 
(both policy and operational) in the federal, state and territory jurisdictions and 40 senior 
employer/industry and union representatives from a number of jurisdictions. The 
interview schedule consisted of a series of open-ended questions asking respondents’ 
views on the OHS effects, if any, of a series of different work arrangements or situations 
(casual/temporary/fixed contract jobs, part-time employment, downsizing/job insecurity, 
self-employment, small business, labour hire, outsourcing, home-based work, telework 
and multiple jobholding). Participants were asked to comment on their experience and to 
express their views on existing regulatory remedies or interventions addressing these 
problems (including, guidance material, tripartite or collaborative initiatives) as well as 
employer and union initiatives. Information obtained in these interviews was combined 
with information derived from an examination of relevant OHS statutes and regulations, 
and government documentary material (codes, guidance material, information bulletins, 
internal and public reports) in all jurisdictions. Documentary material collected after 
completing the project has been incorporated into this paper. 
 
Second, this study draws on interviews and field trips conducted with inspectoral staff 
working for four jurisdictions (Queensland, Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia) in 
2003-4 as part of another research project (hereafter referred to as the Process Standards 
project). In total, over 80 inspectors were interviewed and researchers accompanied 40 of 
these inspectors for a day, entailing at least one workplace visit (covering a wide range of 
industries including farms, schools, prisons, building sites, retail outlets, warehouses and 
factories). Although the project’s primary objective was to examine the shift from 
prescriptive to process and performance standards in OHS legislation, inspectors were 
asked questions about changing work arrangements (the use of temporary workers, leased 
workers, subcontractors etc) as part of this. Issues concerning the use of leased workers 
also arose in the course of workplace visits with inspectors (for which detailed notes were 
kept). 
 
Third and finally, a detailed search and analysis of prosecution reports and court 
proceedings relating to labour hire firms and host firms under OHS legislation was 
undertaken.  
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An Overview of Regulatory Problems 
 
The triangular relationship and the OHS responsibilities of duty-holders  
 
At present in Australia OHS legislation is largely the responsibility of State and Territory 
governments (although the federal government has recently announced its intention to 
take control of the area). Like OHS legislation in the UK, Canada and many other 
countries the legislation enacted by the various state and territory jurisdictions has largely 
been built upon the model established in the UK Robens Report (1972) and includes 
general duty provisions identifying the responsibilities of various parties, including 
employers, self-employed persons (such as contractors and sub-contractors), employees, 
designers, suppliers, importers and manufacturers of plant, equipment and substances for 
use at the workplace. These duties place greater responsibilities on employers in 
comparison to employees in recognition that the former exercise far greater control of the 
workplace and work processes. With regard to other parties, duties are allocated 
commensurate with a chain of responsibility in relation to how, when and to what extent 
their decisions or actions may contribute to a safe and healthy work environment. Hence 
responsibility for faultily designed and manufactured machinery may principally reside 
with those who designed, manufactured or supplied it, especially if the employer using 
the equipment took all reasonable steps to purchase machinery they believed to be safe 
and used it appropriately (in terms of tasks and the training of operators etc).  In short, the 
law allocates responsibility to multiple duty-holders and a single event or failure may 
give rise to simultaneous contraventions of the same or different duties by an array of 
parties. OHS agencies have developed principles which, together with a consideration of 
the facts in each case, they use to decide the degree of blame (affecting the charge 
brought and penalty sought) in relation to breaches involving more than one party. The 
clearest example is in relation to subcontracting arrangements where if, as often happens, 
both the subcontractor and principle contractor are at fault agencies are likely to seek to 
impose a more serious penalty on the latter because of the greater degree of control they 
exercise. As will be seen below a similar approach has been taken in relation to cases 
involving labour hire firms.  
 
The legal framework 
 
With one exception (see below) the Australian OHS statutes do not explicitly refer to 
labour hire arrangements. Labour hire agencies and host firms are regulated by the 
general duties that employers owe to employees and that employers and self-employed 
persons owe to persons other than employees.  
 
Thus if the worker is technically an ‘employee’ of the labour hire agency, the agency 
owes the employee the employer’s general duty to employees: in broad terms to ‘ensure’ 
or to provide and maintain, so far as is reasonably practicable, for ‘employees’ a working 
environment that is safe and without risks to health (see Johnstone, 2004: chapter 4). 
 
Some Australian courts go to considerable lengths to categorise workers as ‘employees’ 
of the labour hire agency. For example, in Swift Placements Pty Ltd v WorkCover 
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Authority of New South Wales (2000) 96 IR 69 the New South Wales Industrial Relations 
Commission in Full Session upheld the trial judge’s decision to categorise a labour hire 
worker as an ‘employee’ of the labour hire company, and rejected an argument that the 
labour hire company was not the employer because the worker was subject to the 
directions of the host firm. The contract between the worker and the labour hire company 
was for the worker to perform work ‘on a casual basis from time-to-time and where the 
performance of work, for which wages would be paid, would depend on the [labour hire 
company] allocating work to [the employee] according to the requirements of its clients.’ 
It contained numerous indicia of the employment relationship, including a sufficient 
degree of control, and contractual terms that the employee had to contact the labour hire 
company daily to ascertain whether work was available, had to attend the place 
nominated for work and undertake the work directed, had to follow the directions of the 
person nominated by the company to give directions (the client), and so on. The Full 
Bench accepted the view taken by the trial judge that the contract between the labour hire 
company and worker obliged the worker to carry out work at the client premises ‘under 
the full direction and control’ of the client. This did not undermine the ‘ultimate or legal 
control’ exercised by the labour hire company, which ultimately would enable the labour 
hire company to dismiss the worker for inadequate performance (see also Mason & Cox 
Pty Ltd v McCann (1999) 74 SASR 438).  
 
If the worker is not an ‘employee’, but an independent contractor (see for example 
Building Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia v Odco (1991) 29 FCR 104 and 
Creighton and Stewart, 2005: 290), then the duty owed by the labour hire agency to the 
worker is under the employer’s statutory duty to persons other than employees. Here the 
most far-reaching provisions are to be found in the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
2004 (Vic) sections 23 and 24 (which strongly resemble section 3 of the British Health 
and Safety at Work Act 1974) and the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld), 
sections 28(3), and 29(2). These provisions state that employers and self-employed 
persons must ensure persons, who are not employees, ‘are not exposed’ to risks to OHS 
arising from ‘the conduct of the undertaking’.1 The courts have taken a broad approach to 
interpreting the key expressions ‘exposed to risk’ (see R v Board of Trustees of the 
Science Museum [1993] 1 WLR 1171) and ‘conduct of the undertaking’ (Whittaker v 
Delmina Pty Ltd  (1998) 87 IR 268 at 280-281; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales 
(Inspector Martin) v Edmund Hubert Kuipers and Civil Services Pty Ltd [2004] 
NSWIRComm 303 para [55]); R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846 at 851-
852; R v Mara [1987] 1 WLR 87; and Sterling-Winthrop Group Limited v Allen (1987) 
SCCR 25).  
 
Although not expressed in the same terms as the Victorian and Queensland duties, the 
duties owed to others in sections 29(1) and 30A(b) of the Work Health Act 1986 (NT) and 
to non-employees in section 21 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1986 (WA) 
                                                 
1   Note that the WHSA(Qld) includes also section 29A, which provides that a person (who may not 
necessarily be an employer or self-employed person) who conducts a business or undertaking 
(even if not conducted for gain or reward) has an obligation to ensure the OHS of each person who 
performs a work activity (even if on a voluntary basis) for the purposes of the business or 
undertaking. 
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would also appear to extend the duties of agencies to labour hire workers who are not 
employees. 
 
In the other Australian jurisdictions the duties to persons other than employees are 
geographically limited. For example, sections 8(2) and 9(1) of the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) are similar to the Victorian and Queensland provisions, but 
specify that the duty only applies to non-employees ‘while they are at the employer’s or 
self-employed person’s place of work.’ Likewise, the provisions in the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act 1989 (ACT) (section 28(1)) and in the Occupational Health and 
Safety (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1991 (Cth) (section 17) restrict the reach of the 
duty to persons ‘at or near the workplace’. These geographical limitations are significant, 
and prevent the duties from extending to labour hire agencies where the worker is not an 
‘employee’ and will not be at or near the agency’s workplace. 
 
While the host employer will always owe a duty of care to the worker under the duty to 
persons other than employees, discussed in the previous paragraphs, some of the 
employer’s general duty provisions are worded so as to enable the courts to find that the 
duty is owed to a worker who is technically an ‘employee’, even if not of the employer 
owing the duty. For example, section 19(1) of the Occupational Health, Safety and 
Welfare Act 1986 (SA) couches the employer’s duty to apply ‘in respect of each 
employee employed or engaged by the employer’. In Moore v Fielders Steel Roofing Pty 
Ltd [2003] SAIRC 75 the South Australian Industrial Court interpreted the expression 
‘engaged’ very broadly to mean ‘provide occupation (for a person)’ so that a person 
employed under a contract of employment by a third party (in this case an ‘employee’ of 
a labour hire agency) and who works for ‘the employer’ pursuant to an agreement 
between the employer and labour hire agency is owed a duty because the ‘employer’ 
‘engages’ the labour hire ‘employee’ even though there is no contract between the 
‘employer’ and the ‘employee’ (see also the definition of ‘employee’ in section 4). 
 
Further, while some of the Australian OHS statutes include provisions which deem 
contractors (and their employees) to be ‘employees’ protected by the employers general 
duty to ‘employees’, the OSHA (WA) deems all labour hire workers, whether employees 
or contractors of the labour hire agency, to be ‘employees’ of both the labour hire agency 
and the client, in relation to matters over which they respectively have the capacity to 
exercise control (section 23F). Section 23F of the Act purports to catch all other 
arrangements, by including similar deeming provisions in relation to ‘labour 
arrangements in general’, that is where any other worker who carries out work for 
another person even if there is no contract between the worker and the other person, 
provided the person has the power of direction and control in relation to that work ‘in a 
similar manner to the power of an employer under a contract of employment’ (section 
23E).  
 
An important point to make about all of these duties is that they are non-delegable and 
the employer (whether the agency or the host) is personally, not vicariously, liable under 
its duty to employees and non-employees (see Linework Limited v Department of Labour 
[2001] 2 NZLR 639; R v British Steel plc [1995] 1 WLR 1356l; R v Associated Octel; and 
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R v Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 78; and WorkCover Authority of New 
South Wales (Inspector Mansell) v Daly Smith Corporation (Aust) Pty Limited and 
Thomas Edwin Curtis Smith [2004] NSWIRComm 349). The employer must ensure that 
not only does it have appropriate processes and procedures to manage OHS so as to 
eliminate, or at least reduce risks, it must ensure that those processes and procedures are 
fully implemented throughout the organisation. It cannot delegate its duty to another 
party, and it is no defence to argue that another party owed an overlapping duty to the 
worker. 
 
Responsibility from the perspective of the agency: a contested terrain 
 
Despite this legal framework, ascribing responsibility in triangular relationships such as 
those involving the use of multi-tiered subcontracting or leased workers, is a source of 
ambiguity and confusion if not a contested terrain in the eyes of the 
contractors/subcontractors or leasing agency on the one hand and the principal contractor 
or host employer on the other hand. Employer attempts to shift the burden of 
responsibility for OHS to their workers or middle managers are common but the 
triangular relationship of labour leasing provides scope for blame shifting to two other 
parties as well as potential for confusion and debate over what shared responsibility 
means in terms of particular activities connected to managing OHS (such as induction 
and training).  
 
This problem is not unique to Australia. Reviewing the situation in the EU, Storrie (2002, 
48) stated: 
 
Nowhere does the duality of the employment relationship combine with the short 
duration of assignment in such a potentially problematic fashion as where issues 
of workplace health and safety are concerned. In most Member States, there is 
some form of dual employer responsibility for these matters. 
 
While in principle there would appear to be a rationale for some form of dual 
responsibility between the agency and the user firm, it is obvious that there is 
potential here not only for a lack of clarity, but also for abuse.  
 
A survey of 1,000 recruitment agencies undertaken for the UK Health and Safety 
Executive provided evidence of this confusion. The survey (HSE, 2000: 13) found 
knowledge of OHS legislation amongst agencies was low, with 80% believing 
responsibility for OHS rested with the host employer. Mel Draper, head of the HSE’s 
Policy Division (HSE Press Release 18 September 2000) stated: 
 
This research confirms that there is a lack of clarity among recruitment agencies 
and host employers about responsibilities for the health and safety of agency 
workers. We are concerned this may lead to some workers not receiving the same 
level of protection as others. Although there was evidence of good practice, it is 
disappointing that on the whole recruitment agencies believe responsibility for 
agency workers’ health and safety is with the host employer.  
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Relatively culpability from the courts’ perspective 
 
Yet the Australian courts have made it clear that both labour hire agencies and host firms 
have extensive OHS legal obligations to leased workers. It is clear that host firms owe the 
same legal OHS duties to labour hire workers as they do to their own workers (see 
Johnstone, 1999). Further, a series of well-publicised prosecutions as well as initiatives 
by government agencies (investigations/special taskforces and the production of guidance 
material etc) have demonstrated that labour hire firms do have far-reaching 
responsibilities for OHS. For example, in the leading case Drake Personnel Limited v 
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch’ng) (1999) 90 IR 432 at 455-56 
the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission in Full Session stated that: 
 
A labour hire agency does not employ people to work for itself but to work for a client, it 
does not directly on a day to day basis supervise the tasks carried out by the employee 
and it is usually not in control of the workplace where the work is done. However, these 
circumstances do not obviate, or diminish, the obligation of the employer under the 
[employer’s general duty]. Indeed ... an employer who sends its employees into another 
workplace over which they exercise limited control is, for that reason, under a particular 
positive obligation to ensure that those premises, or the work done, do not present a 
threat to the health, safety or welfare of those employees. Certainly, there is no basis to 
consider that such an employer has a lesser liability or obligation under [the employer’s 
general duty].… A labour hire company cannot escape liability merely because the client 
to whom an employee is hired out is also under a duty to ensure that persons working at 
their workplace are not exposed to risks to their health and safety or because of some 
alleged implied obligation to inform the labour hire company of the work to be 
performed. In our view, a labour hire company is required by the OH&S Act to take 
positive steps to ensure that the premises to which its employees are sent to work do not 
present risks to health and safety This obligation would, in appropriate circumstances, 
require it to ensure that its employees are not instructed to, and do not, carry out work in 
a manner that is unsafe.  
 
In the present case, it seems to us that this would require, at the very least, that the 
appellant give an express instruction to the client and its employee that it be notified 
before the employee is instructed to work on a different machine. … We add that the 
labour hirer’s obligation under [the employer’s general duty] may not be met by a term 
inserted into the contract between that employer and the third party as to the engagement 
of an employee to do particular tasks to the effect that such employee will not be 
transferred to do other work without prior notice. The labour hirer has a positive 
obligation under section 15(1) to directly supervise and monitor the work of the 
employee to ensure a safe working environment.  
 
In Labour Co-operative Limited v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector 
Robins) (2003) 121 IR 78 at 84-85 the Full Bench of the New South Wales Industrial 
Relations Commission upheld the trial judge’s finding that it was reasonably practicable 
for the labour hire agency to have ensured against the risks to the worker’s safety by 
‘adopting a positive and pro-active approach with [the client] to require steps to be put in  
place to avoid the risks as a condition of it making available’ the services of the worker. 
The labour hire agency had sufficient control to ensure the adequacy of instruction, 
training and supervision, and could refuse to supply its employees to the client ‘until 
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appropriate and sufficient measures to ensure safety were implemented.’ (See also 
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Legge) v Coffey Engineering Pty 
Ltd (No 2) (2001) 110 IR 447). 
 
Since 1998 prosecutions of labour hire agencies and host firms have been taken regularly 
in most Australian jurisdictions, particularly in New South Wales and Victoria. In New 
South Wales, for example, the first prosecution of an agency and a host firm took place in 
1997, and there have been half a dozen or so prosecutions of agencies and of host firms 
each year since 2002. In Victoria the first successful prosecution of an agency and of a 
host firm took place in 1999 (Extrastaff and NCI Speciality Metals respectively), and 
since 2002 there appear to have been half a dozen prosecutions of agencies and of host 
firms annually. There have also been successful prosecutions against directors of labour 
hire companies for failing to prevent the agency from contravening its general duty to the 
worker (see for example Inspector Sharpin v Concrete Civil Pty Ltd and Inspector 
Sharpin v Daryl Smith [2004] NSWIRComm 173 and Workover Authority of New South 
Wales (Inspector Mansell) v Daly Smith Corporation (Aust) Pty Limited and Thomas 
Edwin Curtis Smith [2005] NSWIRComm 101). 
 
Whatever approach to relative liability is argued by employers or taken by OHS 
inspectorates, the courts appear to be prepared to allocate liability equally between the 
agency and the host firm, although the facts of the particular case may sway the court to 
impose greater penalties on one or other of the parties. The New South Wales Industrial 
Relations Commission in a string of cases over the past few years has established clear 
sentencing principles for labour hire cases, building on general principles of OHS 
sentencing developed in that state since the late 1980s. 
 
Briefly, the sentencing judge must assess the relative seriousness of each offender’s 
particular offence in relation to the worst case for which the maximum penalty is 
provided (the proportionality principle). The starting point in sentencing each defendant 
is the ‘objective seriousness of each offence’ – the ‘nature and quality’ of the offence, 
including the seriousness of the risk to which workers were subjected and the seriousness 
of the consequences that could have resulted from the contravention; whether it involves 
obvious and foreseeable risks; and whether there were simple and straightforward steps 
available to remedy any failures on the part of the defendant. The court must also 
determine the need for general deterrence and specific deterrence. In imposing a penalty 
in the first New South Wales labour hire prosecution, Hungerford J in WorkCover 
Authority of New South (Inspector Ankucic) v Drake Personnel Ltd t/a Drake Industrial 
(No 1) (1997) 89 IR 374 at 382 stated that an employer labour hire company ‘has a 
special responsibility to ensure the health, safety and welfare of its employees at the other 
workplace for no other reason than that workplace is removed from the employer’s direct 
management and control and would usually be at a location foreign, or at least unfamiliar, 
to the employees concerned.’ This ‘special duty’ has been emphasised as providing the 
basis for courts to impose penalties on labour hire agencies that will serve as a general 
deterrent to other labour hire agencies (WorkCover Authority of New South (Inspector 
Przibilla) v Hindmarsh & Roddy Engineering Pty Limited [2004] NSWIRComm 383 at 
para 21). Similarly, Boland J in WorkCover Authority of New South (Inspector Atkins) v 
 15
Network Production Personnel Pty Limited [2004] NSWIRComm 71 at para 17 noted 
that: 
 
The incidence of labour hire is now common and widespread. Any person engaged in hiring 
out their employees needs to understand that they have the same responsibilities as other 
employers in respect of occupational health and safety and if they fail in that regards the face 
very significant financial penalty. There is a strong case for including a significant element 
for general deterrence in sentencing the defendant. 
 
In WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Mansell) v Daly Smith 
Corporation (Aust) Pty Limited and Thomas Edwin Curtis Smith [2005] NSWIRComm 
101 at para [42] Staunton J justified an emphasis on general deterrence by reference to 
‘the nature of the obligations imposed upon labour hire companies.’ Her Honour 
observed that  
 
The ‘positive’ obligation attracted by labour hire companies poses a significant duty to 
ensure that their employees are not subjected to risk to health and safety, which is effected, 
in part, by ensuring the work to be undertaken is properly risk assessed and that those 
employees are adequately trained, instructed and supervised as to that work. 
 
Specific deterrence requires the courts to assess factors such as post-incident measures 
taken by the defendant, and other factors indicating whether the defendant shows a 
propensity to re-offend. 
 
Once the ‘objective’ seriousness of the offence been determined, there may be ‘subjective 
considerations’ in relation to each defendant (such as each defendant’s prior record, co-
operation with the inspectorate, contrition, or an early plea of guilty), which might 
mitigate or aggravate the penalty. 
 
In labour hire cases, the offences committed by the agency and the host generally arise 
‘out of the same incident and the different charges result primarily from the different role 
of each defendant’ (WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Christensen) v 
Harnischfeger of Australia Pty Ltd; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector 
Christensen) v Zelbarry International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWIRComm 131, para 46). A key 
sentencing principle is that of parity: ‘equal justice requires that the like should be treated 
alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allowance should be made for them. In 
the case of co-offenders, different sentences may reflect different degrees of culpability 
or their different circumstances’: Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 447 at 301. 
While the principle of parity generally applies to co-offenders convicted of the same 
crime, Haylen J in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Christensen) v 
Harnischfeger of Australia Pty Ltd; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector 
Christensen) v Zelbarry International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWIRComm 131 noted that case 
law showed that ‘it is not unusual, in cases where there are two or more defendants 
involved in the same workplace incident, that an assessment is made that in a general 
sense, although charged under different sections, the culpability of each defendant is 
considered to be broadly equal’ (para 48): see Warman International Ltd v WorkCover 
Authority of New South Wales (1998) 80 IR 326. In WorkCover Authority of New South 
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(Inspector Dall) v Daracon Contractors Pty Limited [2005] NSWIRComm 149 Haylen J 
remarked that: 
 
Parity is to be determined by having regard to the circumstances of the co-offenders and their 
respective degrees of culpability. It will also be determined by different criminal histories, 
which may justify a real difference in sentence. A different factual basis may justify a 
different sentence for a co-offender, but the difference is not to be disproportionate. It is also 
repeatedly said that it does not automatically follow that the co-offender should receive the 
same sentence. 
 
The allocation of relative culpability is best illustrated by some recent decisions of the 
New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission.  
 
In some cases, the court has imposed the same penalty on both the agency and the host 
firm. For example, in WorkCover Authority of New South (Inspector Dall) v Daracon 
Contractors Pty Limited [2005] NSWIRComm 149 Haylen J remarked that, while the 
objective and subjective considerations in for the agency and the host were different, 
 
overall I cannot find [the agency] more culpable than [the host]. I am not satisfied that it is 
less culpable than [the host] … I think that, having regard to the principles I must consider 
that the proper result here is to fine [the agency] the same ultimate sum [as awarded against 
the host firm]. 
 
In other cases, the only difference in overall culpability has been the criminal record of 
one of the parties. In WorkCover Authority of New South (Inspector Gill) v J D Thompson 
Personne Pty Limited; WorkCover Authority of New South (Inspector Gill) v Visy Paper 
Pty Limited [2005] NSWIRComm 73, Backman J at para [89] decided that: 
 
Both defendants failed to ensure a safe system of work in the context of the sorting of paper 
and cardboard recyclable material at [the host’s] premises. Neither defendant conducted a 
risk assessment of the specific task involving the sorting of recyclable paper and cardboard 
(that is, the task being performed by [the worker] at the time of the accident). Neither 
defendant undertook an appropriate audit of the type of work being conducted by [the 
worker], and, neither defendant had in place a documented safety procedure for the work. 
These similarities render the culpabilities of both defendants broadly equal. The [host], 
however, has prior convictions for occupational health and safety offences which mean that 
its overall culpability [and the ultimate penalty imposed] is higher. 
 
In some circumstances, the host firm is held to be relatively more culpable. In WorkCover 
Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Christensen) v Harnischfeger of Australia Pty 
Ltd; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Christensen) v Zelbarry 
International Pty Ltd [2004] NSWIRComm 131 Haylen J considered that the host firm 
had comprehensively failed to carry out its OHS obligations, with numerous deficiencies 
in the firm’s system of work demonstrating that it had committed ‘a serious breach of the 
Act’ (for details see para [59]). It had also previously been convicted of an offence under 
the Act (including a failure to perform a risk assessment). Subjective factors which 
mitigated culpability were the firm’s early plea of guilty and the steps it took to 
investigate and report the incident, and to co-operate with the inspectorate. Taking all of 
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these factors into account, the court imposed a fine of $200,000 upon the client firm.  The 
agency had failed to establish systems requiring the host to report relevant training, 
incidents and other matters, and did not conduct a risk assessment when the work began. 
The evidence suggested ‘a wholesale delegation’ if the agency’s responsibilities to the 
host (para [65]). Haylen J (at para [65]) rejected the agency’s submission that it was 
entitled to rely upon the host’s safety system: 
 
Cases abound in this jurisdiction which underline the requirement of labour hire 
companies …, when relying on the system of the host employer, to satisfy itself that the 
system adopted was more than a paper system, was actively enforced and policed at the 
workplace and was effective as a safe system of work: a labour hire company is required 
by the Occupational Health and Safety Act to take positive steps to ensure that the 
premises to its employees are sent do not represent risks to health and safety. … Any 
relevant discussion by [the agency] with its employee … would have raised immediate 
concerns about the actual system of work rather than that which had been laid down as 
policy. It is these factors which underline the seriousness of the omissions of [the agency] 
and the seriousness of this particular breach.’ 
 
While Haylen J accepted that, in the circumstances, the agency was not as culpable as the 
host, he did not accept that there was a large difference in culpability. The ‘subjective 
considerations’ reducing the penalty of the agency (early plea of guilty, good prior OHS 
record, the concern and contrition of the agency, and the steps taken after the incident) 
were greater than those applying to the host firm, and the court imposed a fine of 
$140,000 on the agency. 
 
On the other hand, in WorkCover Authority of New South (Inspector Przibilla) v 
Hindmarsh & Roddy Engineering Pty Limited [2004] NSWIRComm 383 Boland J 
imposed a higher penalty ($170,000) on the agency than on the host firm ($117,000 in 
Inspector Przibilla v Hyne & Son Pty Limited [2004] NSWIRComm 384). While both the 
host and agency suggested that the worker’s inadvertence had contributed to his injury, 
Boland J (WorkCover Authority of New South (Inspector Przibilla) v Hindmarsh & 
Roddy Engineering Pty Limited [2004] NSWIRComm 383 at paras [20] and [21]) stated 
that: 
 
there is a responsibility on the [agency] to ensure that [the worker] was not placed at risk 
of injury regardless of any carelessness or inadvertence on the part of the employee. In 
putting arrangements into place to protect workers from injury an employer is required to 
take into consideration human frailties and guard against them. The arrangements this 
[agency] had in place to meet its responsibilities under [the employer’s general duty] 
were completely inadequate. 
 
… Extra care is required in the circumstances of an unfamiliar environment and the 
employer has to approach its responsibilities regarding occupational health and safety as 
though the workplace was its own. 
 
In sentencing the host firm (WorkCover Authority of New South (Inspector Przibilla) v 
Hyne & Son Pty Limited [2004] NSWIRComm 384 at para [32]) Boland J remarked that: 
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I do not consider the offence committed by [the host] as objectively serious as that 
committed by the [agency]. In [the agency] case the failures related to the system of work 
and supervision. In the present case the failures related to the system of work and 
supervision and instruction. The difference in the failures charged is not significant. The 
[agency], however, was the employer of [the worker] and had an immediate and direct 
responsibility to ensure [the worker’s] safety. Moreover, the employer failed to take 
adequate steps to ensure the proper supervision of [the worker] in the absence of [the 
agency supervisor] on the day of the incident and to set up work arrangements with [the 
host] to ensure [the worker] would not be placed at risk. In my opinion, the contribution 
by the [agency] to the risk was greater than that of [the host]. 
 
Labour hire agency approaches to OHS legal responsibilities 
 
Despite the relative clarity of the legal responsibilities of labour hire agencies, available 
evidence indicates considerable variations amongst labour hire firms in terms of 
acknowledging and meeting these responsibilities. In 2004 the Recruitment and 
Consulting Services Association (RCSA) – the body representing labour hire operators in 
Australia (with around 1000 members in 2002) – undertook a survey of member firms. 
The majority of respondents stated that they always or usually ensured employees were 
aware of site OHS procedures (90%) and site hazards (83%), assessed the client's OHS 
management system (71%), conducted pre-placement workplace inspections (74%) and 
provided on-site training (63%). On the other hand only 41% always or usually provided 
protective equipment without charging the employee. Disturbingly, only 16% always or 
usually refused to supply employees to a client for OHS reasons, and 43% stated they 
never refused on this ground (RCSA cited in Curtain, 2004). It should be noted that the 
RCSA tends to represent larger and more established labour hire operators and has 
produced OHS guidance material for members so these results may not be representative 
of all firms in the industry. Further, findings on the provision of information, training and 
so on need to be treated cautiously as a British study (HSE, 2000: 8) found a significant 
discrepancy between agency and agency worker responses in this regard (with only 40% 
of workers claiming they been informed of specific features of their placements affecting 
OHS – far lower than the number of agencies claiming to provide this information). 
 
In recent years labour leasing firms and the RCSA have been involved in collaborative 
working parties or consultation on the development of guidance material relating to 
labour hire by government OHS agencies. This shift can be interpreted as a pragmatic 
acceptance that labour hire firms have legal responsibilities. However, as in other 
countries there are ongoing tensions between the industry (or elements within it) and 
regulators over the extent of these obligations and even whether labour hire firms should 
have legislative obligations. Unions have been critical of the RCSA’s involvement in the 
production of guidance material, seeing it as an attempt to head-off more stringent 
regulatory requirements. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU, 2000a) has 
criticized these publications for understating the obligations of labour hire firms under 
OHS statutes and for not mentioning unions, HSRs OHS representatives, consultative 
processes or participation by leased workers in host employer OHS management systems.  
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With the regard to the extent of obligations, labour hire industry representatives are apt to 
point to practical difficulties. For example, a representative interviewed for the 
WorkCover NSW project stated: 
 
There are clients in remote areas in Western Australia, clients up in the northwest 
who say we want someone. It is not economic for me to fly someone up there, 
check out the health and safety, come back and report say ‘yes its okay to send 
somebody up’ and then three weeks later go and check it again. I’m reliant on the 
host employer to have adequate occupational health and safety provisions and 
our contractual relationship being one where there’s dual trust that they’re doing 
the right thing. I am not able to contract out of my obligations but I am also not 
able to monitor all these different sites for all these different workers. It’s a 
physical impossibility. 
 
The same representative also noted that labour hire companies are in a weak 
situation when they detect problems. 
 
An argument we run as an industry, and we would do it at our company as well, 
is that occupational health and safety is a joint responsibility. We as the direct 
employer are responsible for induction, teaching them (workers) basic 
occupational health and safety routines – how to lift things, how to do this, how 
to do that – but we can’t be responsible for the maintenance of machinery, where 
people happen to drop pallets in the warehouse, all those other sorts of things. 
We can walk into a client and say ”you don’t have any safety guards on that 
machinery.“ Our options are twofold. Either to sit there and say ”we’re not doing 
any work until you put safety guards on that” or call out workers out. With so 
much competition in the marketplace, sure we can pull our workers out but there 
are plenty of others queued up behind us that will put their workers in there just 
to get the turnover.  
 
Even ignoring these complexities, the provision of workers belonging to dozens if not 
hundreds of different occupations into thousands of different workplaces clearly poses a 
serious logistical challenge in terms of ensuring adequate risk assessment, induction, 
training and supervision.  One way of dealing with this would be for labour hire firms to 
revert to more specialised fields of activity, becoming niche suppliers to those areas 
where they believe they can manage risks. There is evidence of niche suppliers in 
industries like mining (where use has also been made of multi-workplace induction 
‘passports’). Even so, some gaps remain, with one mine manager observing: 
 
Contractors were saying to us: “we come and go very regularly but we miss 
things that happen in the intervening period such as safety alerts or toolbox 
talks.” They (the alerts and talks) were still relevant and current at that time but 
for some reason they missed it. So its an issue of how you keep the constant 
information flow. 
 
Most fundamentally perhaps, reverting to a niche approach is not a general solution as it 
is unlikely to appeal to medium to large labour hire operators.  
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Another option would be the ‘preferred subcontractor’ model where labour leasing firms 
sought to build a long-term relationship with clients where commitment to OHS on both 
sides was seen to be critical to renewed engagements. Again, while some labour hire 
firms have made efforts in this regard the competitive nature of the industry is a major 
impediment. As one labour hire firm manager observed: 
 
…centralised purchasing has a basic fault in that ‘they are what they are’, and 
therefore the first thing they look at is price, the second thing they look at is price 
and the third thing they look is price. They tend to disregard some of these what 
they say is periphery ”fluffy things”. They’re not worried about OHS…What we 
do find is that a sophisticated user of our services will understand and will look at 
our occupational health and safety processes - our induction processes and out 
history and they will use that as part of the evaluation criteria. But the 
sophisticated users – it’s the old 80/20 rule – is only 20% of the market. The 
other 80% are unsophisticated users and unsophisticated users don’t care. 
 
The moot point is whether the logistical constraints just mentioned should influence OHS 
standards and the allocation of responsibility amongst duty holders when this issue does 
not arise in a direct employment relationship. 
 
Regulators’ views of labour hire compliance 
 
When asked to comment on changed work arrangements, labour hire/agency work was 
by far the issue most frequently nominated as especially problematic by inspectors and 
other regulatory officers interviewed for the WorkCover NSW project (2001/2) and the 
Process Standards project (2003/4). While several agencies had undertaken projects on 
labour hire the perceptions of interviewees were mostly based on their own direct 
experience, with many nominating particular incidents as indicative of the problems they 
were encountering. We also had a chance to witness these issues first hand while 
accompanying inspectors on workplace visits for the Process Standards project. For 
example, during one visit to a large manufacturing plant to investigate an incident where 
a worker had been hit by a forklift truck, it was revealed that several forklift drivers 
supplied by a labour hire firm had been ‘sent back’ after it was discovered they lacked 
basic competency even though they held a forklift driver’s license. 
 
The WorkCover NSW project identified a number of trends or features of labour hire that 
regulators saw as disturbing.  One was the growing use of labour hire by small firms, 
which was seen to pose greater risks, as these firms were less likely to have a formal 
OHS management system in place or the resources to undertake induction etc. Another 
point of concern was the potentially dangerous association of labour hire with other 
changes to work organisation. In its submission to the NSW Labour Hire Task Force, 
WorkCover NSW (2001: 59-60) stated: 
 
Companies often resort to labour hire as a short term solution to problems created 
by organisational changes such as: rapid downsizing, plant closures, budget cuts, 
shifts in operations, repeated phases of management restructuring, and other 
forms of corporate restructure. As a result their management systems are often in 
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disarray, and labour hire workers step into environments of elevated OHS risk 
arising from adverse effects created by this process.  
 
Several regulatory officials pointed to the more positive experience in some industries, 
with one referring to the hotel sector of the hospitality industry where she noted labour 
hire firms insisted on a level of training (one used a virtual kitchen) before these workers 
(including chefs, waiters, bar staff and kitchen hands) could be leased to a host employer. 
Regulatory officers were also able to nominate labour hire firms that had made 
significant efforts in terms of managing OHS risks (including induction, training and 
prior-entry risk assessment). As one officer observed: 
 
We’ve got some labour hire agencies, probably from medium-sized to large, who 
will not provide staff on short notice. So the host employer calls them and says “I 
want a worker to do certain things and I want them here at six o’clock tomorrow 
morning.” In many cases if they don’t already have a relationship with the host 
employer they will decline the opportunity to provide labour. So we’re starting to 
develop a culture at least amongst the large organisations that if you haven’t seen 
the workplace and you’ve got no idea of what risks you’re exposing your 
employee to then for god sake don’t send them out there. The second things is 
that we got a number of agencies that are not supplying labour to their clients 
without them first having undertaken an induction in their own organisation. 
Now the labour hire agency receives an offer of employment from somebody on 
their database. That person will have already been through their generic 
organisation induction so they’ll have gone through the pay rules and how 
everything operates but also there’s an OHS element in there as well. This is how 
our safety system operates and in the event of any issues these are the steps you 
have to follow. So they give them a very rudimentary introduction into risk 
assessment.  
 
Even with regard to these firms there were problems as the officer went on to point out: 
 
The difficulty in all of that is what happens when they’re in the host employer? 
Does the host employer give them an equally adequate induction and introduce 
them to the way the safety system operates? Now that’s where we seem to find 
the system breaks down.   
 
Further, as in the UK (see HSE, 2000: 1) the vast majority of labour hire operations are 
small and lack the experience, expertise or logistical resources to provide adequate 
induction/training let alone develop sophisticated OHS management systems (and 
including some moonlight operators with a cavalier attitude to regulatory compliance. 
Gryst, 1999).  There is also considerable turnover amongst small operators, accentuated 
during any economic downturn, with one industry spokesperson claiming that 40% of 
operators had ‘disappeared’ in the 1991 recession. This volatility represents a 
considerable challenge to regulators, limiting the ‘learning’ effect of enforcement. For 
example, officers in one jurisdiction referred to the impending prosecution of a firm 
(whose first placement had been killed), noting that the prosecuted firm would probably 
go out of business and its place taken by another equally inexperienced operator. 
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Overall, the many concerns expressed by regulators were consistent with views expressed 
by host employers and unions interviewed as part of the WorkCover NSW project. 
During discussions held with Industry Reference Groups (IRG) a number of employer 
representatives expressed the view that in their experience, leased workers were more 
problematic in terms of OHS than temporary workers they directly hired. For example, at 
the Health and Community Services IRG reference was made to difficulties in knowing 
the precise skill mix (and not just in relation to OHS) of staff received and potential 
problems that could arise when leased staff were transferred from their original task to 
another after arrival. For their part, representatives of the labour leasing industry were apt 
to argue that, while many host employers adopted a responsible attitude, some showed 
little interest or concern for the supervision of leased workers.  
 
The IRG meetings and interviews indicated that labour hire was a particular concern for 
unions. Union representatives repeatedly claimed that the desire of leased workers to 
obtain further work with that host and possibly a permanent position caused them to 
accept inferior conditions, to work faster (and unsustainably as ‘rate busters’ in some 
instances) or cut corners in relation to OHS, and to be reluctant to raise OHS problems 
with management. In one of a number of cases cited (some with supporting 
documentation), representatives from the Victorian Meat Industry Employees Union 
(AMIEU) referred to the use of labour hire workers in small boning rooms with inferior 
OHS standards that would not have been accepted by permanent employees and the 
difficulties HSRs encountered in addressing these issues.  Similarly, the rail transport 
union claimed that locomotive drivers retained by several labour hire firms could exceed 
maximum hours/fatigue management regulations by taking sequential shifts with 
different private rail freight operators. Other problems raised included failure to provide 
adequate induction, training and supervision; the use of illegal immigrants (and other 
'illegal' arrangements including tax evasion2 and engaging workers in receipt of social 
security payments); and the use of labour hire as a form of probationary employment. 
Again, representatives of the labour hire industry rejected these claims. However, as the 
statement of one manager indicates, these responses actually lent support to the 
regulatory and other problems posed by labour hire: 
 
The unions will consistently raise this one (that) workers are bullied into 
submission. That’s not true. In the unskilled area there is a ready supply of 
labour. Sure we’ll hang on to a reliable worker and we’ll ask the unreliable ones 
to move on. So from that point of view there is a culture of compliance. But 
there’s also pressure coming back from awards and so on, and this again is a 
South Australian ruling, if the person is there for more than 12 months in the one 
job then they must be offered a full-time job. That’s well and good and that’s 
understandable but that’s not what our clients want. Our clients use us because 
they want a flexible workforce. They’re fruit pickers and the fruit’s only picked 
four months of the year or if they’re warehouses like (names company) then they 
                                                 
2  Recent litigation involving state and federal taxation authorities supports these allegations. See, for 
example, Trylow & Anor v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 446 (Hill J) 16 April 2004, 
Sydney; Moore Park Gardens v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW), [2004] NSWSC 417 
(Gzell J) 19 May 2004; and Forstaff & Os v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) [2004] 
NSWSC 573 (McDougall J), 8 July 2004. 
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do have peaks and troughs and going into Christmas you want a lot of workers. 
They pull in those temporary people and then once Christmas is over they let 
them go because they don’t need them anymore. They don’t have to go through 
the hassles of employing, they don’t have to go through all the issues with the 
unions and it’s a nice clean relationship as far as they are concerned…The only 
area where some bullying may occur is in highly technical areas where there’s a 
very limited pool of candidates and that’s where you try to grab a candidate and 
hang on to him (sic) because you know he is able to service your clients to their 
needs. The incentive is to try and engender the loyalty of the person. If you can’t 
engender their loyalty then you use whatever other tactics are available to keep 
them in because they’re a valuable commodity. 
 
By and large regulators interviewed supported union contentions that labour leasing was 
conducive to an erosion of working conditions, including OHS, via the manipulatory 
avoidance, if not outright evasion, of regulatory standards (see also Gryst, 1999). A 
report prepared for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (Storrie, 2002: 52-3) reached similar conclusions about the scope for 
compliance problems:  
 
In France the national report states that ‘everyone knows…and the Labour 
Inspectorate is aware’ that is easy to circumvent the limitations on assignment 
duration. The UK national report refers to trade union sources that claim ‘…clear 
evidence of considerable abuse and malpractice.’ It cites avoidance of statutory 
holiday pay and non-payment of social security contributions as examples. The 
German report mentions abuse in the regulation of working time, holiday pay and 
sick pay, and refers in particular to some agencies bypassing their obligation to 
pay wages during ‘unproductive periods’ by providing such wage substitution on 
the basis of only 35 hours per week when workers may have been working longer 
hours. A postal campaign by Austrian trade unions to inform temporary agency 
workers of their employment rights has led to a large number of court cases, 
mainly concerning the payment of wages when not hired out. 
 
Attempts to eliminate responsibility 
 
Beyond the debate over how to share responsibility there is a more extreme position. In 
the course of a series of state and federal government inquiries into OHS, labour 
hire/contracting and employment standards individual labour hire firms and industry 
representatives (or those sympathetic to them) have argued that shared responsibility is 
onerous and impractical and OHS responsibilities should reside exclusively with the host 
employer (see representations by the Master Builders Association to the NSW Labour 
Hire Task Force Final Report, 2001: 10 and the Maxwell inquiry in Victoria, 2004). 
During interviews for the WorkCover NSW project in 2001-2, regulatory staff in half the 
jurisdictions visited indicated that labour-leasing firms had expressed similar views to 
them. This viewpoint was seen as both perplexing and alarming. To take the words of one 
regulator, ‘any party who, to an extent, had control of OHS had legislative 
responsibilities under the general duty provisions’. Agency staff referred to serious 
incidents that had occurred as a result of misunderstandings or confusion over legal 
responsibilities.  
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Removing or severely circumscribing the obligations of labour hire firms was viewed 
with alarm on a number of other grounds. These included evidence of poorer OHS 
outcomes associated with labour leasing and concerns that small firms (with limited 
resources etc) were now making greater use of labour hire. Further, such a move would 
negate the well-established and fundamental principle of OHS law that general duties are 
personal and non-delegable. It would create inconsistencies regarding the legal 
obligations of parties in analogous situations, like those between contractors and 
subcontractors (arguably worse as labour hire could be viewed as a highly structured 
form of subcontracting). Finally, it would set a dangerous precedent by providing a 
specific exemption to the otherwise wide range of duty holders (including multiple duty 
holders in vertical and horizontal chains of responsibility) that is central feature of post-
Robens OHS legislation. Taken as a whole, it is not hard to see why regulators were 
concerned. If ambiguity about shared responsibility resulted in narrowing the scope of 
legal obligations (rather than clarification) this would amount to the compliance problems 
associated with particular work arrangements effectively dictating OHS standards (at 
least for some parties) with potential cascading effects on the regulatory regime (as 
parties responded to inconsistencies). 
 
Attempts to limit legal obligations for OHS are not confined to labour hire firms. 
Although host firms cannot deny a legislative duty to workers engaged in their 
undertakings a number have sought to ‘risk shift’ via hold harmless contracts. Hold 
harmless clauses essentially entail an agreement by one party to a contract to take 
complete responsibility for an issue/area and thereby indemnify the other party for any 
losses incurred in relation to any incidence arising in this area, such as damages claims or 
fines imposed arising from a failure to comply with OHS regulatory standards. In the 
case of labour leasing this could (and usually does) mean the labour hire firm agreeing to 
assume responsibility for the OHS of leased workers and the costs of any OHS breaches 
that arise in connection with this. The use of these contracts appears to have originated in 
the USA but by 2000 concern was being expressed about their increasing use in 
Australia, by unions and even several multinational labour hire firms. Labour hire firm 
representatives interviewed for the WorkCover NSW project referred to the pressure to 
accept contracts, with one observing: 
 
We’ve got three or four clients (who use them). Its not so much the competitive 
edge, it’s the pressure from the host employer or client who says ‘I will only do 
business with a company that has a hold harmless contract’ and particularly those 
companies seem to be the large global American companies who have global 
policies, who have in-house legal teams and who go through a due diligence 
process with their insurers every year…some guy sits back in Milwaukee, and (in 
relation to the general duties in Australian OHS legislation) have no idea, have 
no idea. 
 
Consistent with this, in 2003 a survey of labour hire firms undertaken Brennan, Valos and 
Hindle (2003) found that 45% of firms who were members of the Recruitment and 
Consulting Services Association (or RCSA, which represents the labour hire industry in 
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Australia) and 47% of non-RCSA members had been asked to sign hold harmless 
contracts.  
 
Regulatory officers from a number of jurisdictions interviewed for the WorkCover NSW 
project (Quinlan, 2003) referred to the growing use of hold harmless contracts by host 
employers, including government agencies and departments (a development they found 
especially deplorable). The provisions were viewed as an attempt to defeat the intent of 
general duty provisions in OHS legislation or at least obfuscate legal responsibilities in 
the eyes of the parties in ways that would make enforcement more difficult even if the 
contracts cannot formally shift liability under OHS legislation. Regulators believed the 
attempt to defeat legislative intent (as well as public interest tests) made the contracts 
unenforceable and reference was made to court decisions in Western Australia and South 
Australia affirming this (the situation with claims for damages for injury appears more 
ambiguous. (See The Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation (Appellant) 
v JR Engineering Services Pty Ltd, Western Mining Corporation (Olympic Dam 
Operations) and Jeffrey John Ball (Respondent 3), No. SCGRG 94/970 Judgment No. 
4992, Workers' Compensation [1995] SASC 4992 (10 March 1995)). Notwithstanding 
this and a growing number of successful prosecutions of both host employers and labour 
hire firms for OHS breaches, the absence of a direct challenge to the use of hold harmless 
contracts by parliaments or enforcement agencies has enabled confusion amongst duty 
holders to continue even though US experience (based on very different OHS laws) 
would question the enforceability and ‘value’ of hold harmless clauses (Johnstone, 
Mayhew and Quinlan, 2001).  
 
Worker Involvement and the willingness to raise OHS issues 
 
Beyond the challenges posed for general duty provisions, the increased use of labour hire, 
along with direct-hire temporary workers and subcontractors, can also weaken the scope 
for worker involvement in OHS, both in terms of their capacity/willingness to raise 
problems at the workplace and the effectiveness of participatory mechanisms established 
by legislation, notably workplace OHS committees and health and safety representatives 
or HSRs (Johnstone, Quinlan and Walters, 2005). Both the HSR and committee 
provisions in the OHS statutes tend to be geared towards conventional employer-
employee relationships (see Johnstone et al, 2005), and are ill-suited to triangular labour 
hire arrangements. Further, labour hire arrangements themselves undermine the 
effectiveness of worker representation. Although there is limited vetting of participatory 
mechanisms as part of workplace inspections, regulatory officers interviewed for the 
WorkCover NSW project readily identified the problem. In South Australia the agency 
(then part of the WorkCover Corporation) investigated the issue, with one of those 
involved stating: 
 
We found that organisations that have got temporary labour hire and casual staff 
will tend to consult with the permanent employees and they may only be five and 
then you’ve got 300 casual employees and they wonder why people don’t know 
about policies and processes and people are not being supervised etc.  
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Consistent with Aronsson’s (1999) research in Sweden, regulators interviewed for the 
WorkCover project argued that temporary workers and contractors were less likely to 
raise OHS problems than their permanent counterparts, or to have these issues treated 
seriously when they did raise them. There was evidence that, mirroring the risk shifting 
amongst duty holders referred to earlier, labour hire workers and subcontractors were 
‘internalising’ responsibility for OHS. A survey of workers undertaken for Workplace 
Safety Board in Tasmania broke respondents into five attitudinal groups (the committed, 
the uninvolved, the dis-empowered, responsibility avoiders and risk accepters). When 
discussing ‘risk accepters’ who constituted 17% of the survey, the report commented that 
many workers in this group had expressed the view that they hadn’t raised OHS issues 
with their boss because he didn’t own the premises where they worked (ie they were 
labour hire or outsourced to another workplace or work was undertaken away from their 
employer’s premises). In other words, these workers frequently believed OHS could not 
be addressed since any concern raised would need to be relayed by their ‘boss’ to the 
party in control.  
 
Regulators also believed that labour hire workers were reluctant to raise OHS issues with 
their ‘host’ employer for fear this would adversely affect their employment - fears 
accentuated by the knowledge that ‘host’ employers could terminate engagements 
without giving a reason and the increasing use of labour hire as a probationary step to a 
permanent job. Typical were the comments of an OHS regulator responsible for the 
construction industry: 
 
…working with the (names a building material firm), a common practice there is 
they try and bypass all the unfair dismissal legislation by initially getting all their 
staff from a labour hire firm and they use the two or three months as an 
assessment period and then they ask the labour hire firm “we’d like to employ 
this person full-time.” So I think we’re finding more employers are using labour 
hire firms as part of their selection process…You don’t need to give the labour 
hire company any reason as to why you don’t want the worker. 
 
A related issue concerns the willingness of labour hire workers to raise problems 
with inspectors (either by phone or in the course of a workplace visit). The 
majority of inspectors interviewed for the Process Standards project believed 
worker reluctance to raise OHS issues for fear of employer-initiated reprisal was a 
serious issue and a significant minority were able to nominate specific instances 
of victimisation. Again, labour hire workers are especially vulnerable in this 
regard because their employment is temporary, can be terminated without reasons 
and they are less likely to belong to unions.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Australian OHS statutes impose significant and far-reaching obligations on labour 
hire agencies in relation to leased workers, and courts determining liability and penalties 
in OHS prosecutions start from the position that labour hire agencies and host firms have 
equal responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of labour hire workers. As we 
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showed earlier in this paper, these obligations require labour hire agencies and host firms 
to conduct proper inductions, hazard identification and risk assessment and control 
processes, and to ensure proper instruction, training and supervision of workers placed 
with host firms. Our empirical evidence, however, suggests that as with practices like 
outsourcing, there was a concern amongst regulators that the growth of labour leasing 
was effectively leading to special pleading for lower OHS standards on the basis that 
these arrangements were too difficult for the parties (employer, labour hire firm or 
subcontractor) to control the attendant risks. 
 
Regulators have started to respond to the problems associated with labour hire by 
producing guidance material on the legal responsibilities of both labour hire firms, 
commissioning research, establishing tripartite taskforces, initiating campaigns, 
prosecuting labour hire firms and host employers for OHS breaches following serious 
incidents, and establishing workers’ compensation premiums specific to the industry. It is 
unclear whether these responses will be sufficient to curb problems because of the 
difficulty of ‘educating’ duty holders in a context where there are numerous small 
operators (amongst whom there is considerable turnover) and labour hire is but one of a 
range of issues (including others related to workplace change) with which agencies must 
contend. Unions have sought to stimulate a more effective regulatory response by issuing 
their own guidance material (eg ACTU, 2000b); establishing labour hire activist networks 
and hotlines (to report regulatory breaches); trying to insert OHS provisions on labour 
hire in awards and industrial agreements (such as the NSW Secure Employment Test 
Case); calling for more vigorous enforcement; and pressing for additional regulatory 
controls – most notably the compulsory registration and licensing of all labour hire 
operators. European experience suggests such measures would need to be vigorously 
administered to have the desired effect and this might prove difficult for already 
‘stretched’ inspectorates. Nonetheless, as with a number of other contingent work 
arrangements, the widespread use of agency work poses a serious threat to the 
maintenance of OHS standards that cannot be ignored by regulators. 
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